A second-hand account of the reality of war in Ukraine with lessons for the Australian Army
The war in Ukraine has generated a vast body of real-time observation on modern combat, particularly at the tactical level. Unlike historical campaigns, these lessons are still emerging, shaped by rapidly evolving technology and adaptation on both sides.
This guest article by my colleague David McCammon examines key tactical developments in Ukraine, focusing on how modern forces are applying, adapting, and, in some cases, rediscovering principles that have shaped warfare for centuries.
While BattlefieldTravels is primarily focused on historical battlefields, the underlying relationship between terrain, decision-making, and adaptation remains a constant. This article extends that perspective into a contemporary conflict.
Lessons from the Eastern Front
Guest Author – David McCammon
David McCammon is a senior Australian Army officer, with extensive experience in combined and joint operations. He writes on contemporary warfare and tactical adaptation.
Modern warfare, as seen on the Eastern Front, is defined by fragile logistics, pervasive drone use, and small, decentralised teams operating with limited support, which forces junior leaders to make rapid decisions under extreme uncertainty. Success depends on cognitive skills over technology, including disciplined situational awareness, procedural identification, adaptive leadership, and the ability to operate independently without reliable resupply, evacuation, or higher command control. The central lesson from this article is that modern armies must train realistically for chaos, loss, and autonomy at the lowest levels, or risk avoidable casualties when confronted with the realities of contemporary combat.
Introduction
For months now, I’ve been in private conversation with a volunteer fighting on the Eastern Front in Ukraine. Nothing he has told me came through official channels, after‑action reviews, or doctrinal committees. It is raw, lived experience from a man who fights daily in contested ground where drones, fear, exhaustion, and improvisation define survival. I’ve cross‑checked his observations against open reporting; the alignment is stark. The modern battlefield has accelerated far beyond much of Western peacetime thinking. And the soldiers who will absorb the first blows of that learning curve are our junior leaders.
This piece blends his candid insights with the leadership lessons we already know but too often forget. The emphasis is on what is happening now – unfiltered reality from the front.
1. The Supply Chain Collapses First
“Issued” means whatever isn’t destroyed. After artillery flattened the basement he slept in, his personal helmet and rifle were crushed. A resupply drone eventually dropped him a helmet; he picked up an AK1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AKM from a dead Russian and pushed forward.
Food, water, batteries, medical supplies, if you get them, it’s because a drone survived the flight. Heavy‑lift platforms are intercepted often enough that soldiers step off, carrying deep-ammunition buffers, loaded not by doctrine but by necessity. Units fight with mixed generations of kit: early‑2000s armour beside modern plates, personal stores beside issued gear. The comfortable idea that logistics is predictable evaporates on Day One of a peer fight. A soldier who has never trained without guaranteed resupply is a soldier not preparing.
This reality is starkly confirmed in RUSI’s detailed examinations of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict2https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/four-years-ten-lessons-russias-war-ukraine and US Army analyses of contested logistics, which document how drone interdiction has turned main supply routes into ‘killing zones,’ forcing both sides to rely on small-drone drops and ad-hoc buffers rather than predictable resupply convoys.
2. Know Everything – Beyond Your Lane
He stressed that positive identification (PID)3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combat_identification starts before you see anyone. That means knowing friendly locations, likely approaches, and empty buildings; tracking who is meant to be in the AO via tools like Mil Chat or Kropyva; and understanding what ‘normal’ looks like right now. Moving into a tree line, his team met three men in multicam with M4 Carbines4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M4_carbine who looked perfectly friendly. They couldn’t name a single friendly unit operating nearby. That thread, pulled hard, exposed infiltrators. Situational awareness is not a map trace; it’s constant, disciplined curiosity about your battlespace.
3. Positive Identification (PID) Is Cognitive, Not Cosmetic
‘The hardest thing is PID,’ he told me. ‘Tape is a stupid idea. Russians carry different colours to blend in.’ Open reporting shows that both sides routinely spoof markers. Night vision, drones, thermal, every modern aid compresses friendly and enemy into similar silhouettes. Under these conditions, PID is procedural and behavioural: challenges, questions, timings, routes, and observed patterns, not armbands. Mistaken identity is one of the most lethal threats on today’s battlefield. Train PID as a thought process, not a colour scheme.
4. Trust Is Earned in Contact – Not Assumed
‘Don’t train like you can trust the man next to you,’ he said. ‘Most people freeze the first time rounds crack past. Drones drop and they run. I’ve seen tough people cry from gunshots.’ This is not criticism; it is human nature. Leadership under fire anticipates paralysis; it doesn’t act surprised by it. Design teams and drills that expect human shock responses and still function. The aim must be to train so realistically and repeatedly that soldiers can trust the person next to them when the moment arrives.
5. Share the Load – Leadership Diffuses in the Fight
Western habit: one person commands, everyone else executes. Reality: in close, fast contact, decisions diffuse instantly across the team. Leadership is shared because it has to be; momentum beats theatrical control. Build trust so individuals act on intent without waiting for permission, and back them when they do. This reinforces earlier work by David Kilcullen on Battle Command concepts for the Australian Army.5https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/australian-army-journal-aaj/volume-1-number-2/essential-debate-combined-arms-and-close-battle-complex-terrain
6. Command: The Four‑Man Reality
Teams fight in packets of three to six because anything larger is seen and struck by drones. One soldier is designated the Ground Force Commander for that mission, empowered to call in First Person View (FPV) drones, counter‑battery, and whatever else is available. Further back, a Joint Tactical Operations Centre (JTOC) (or equivalent) sees the fight through dozens of drone feeds, but cannot micromanage through jamming, lag, and chaos. Movement is coordinated through secure chat to deconflict with friendly FPVs but even then, ‘a lot of dudes still get shwacked.’ Mission command isn’t an aspiration, it is survival. Train junior leaders to decide early, with incomplete information, and live with the consequences.
This mirrors documented shifts in both Ukrainian and Russian tactics, where small 4-6 man infiltration groups have become the norm to survive drone-saturated airspace, as reported by Ukrainian commanders and open-source assessments.
7. Training Must Match the Sensory Violence of Combat
‘Blanks don’t cut it,’ he said. ‘In tight spaces you don’t understand blast, dust, overpressure, or how fast fine motor skills disappear.’ His team rehearses constantly before stepping off: patrolling, clearing blindages, grenade drills, trench penetration, and immediate action on drones. They practise live because the environment is live. He also noted that no sterile range prepares you for the choking dust, smoke and carcinogenic debris that hang in the air after high explosives in enclosed spaces. The first time breaks people. Train until dust, noise, blast, and fear feel familiar enough that your drills survive them.
8. Passage of Information Saves the Next Team
Unusual activity – odd digging, new mine patterns, unexpected silence – is rarely unique. ‘If Russians do something strange, pass it up. Most of them will do it.’ Both sides lean heavily on SOPs6https://www.army.mil/article/238732/standard_operating_procedures_this_is_the_way_weve_always_done_it; if one team sees a change, others will soon. Reporting is not administrative; it is protective. It buys others time and saves limbs.
9. Doctrine Is Useful Until It Isn’t
Western armies love standardisation and predictability. The Eastern Front has neither. Centralised responses often arrive too slowly. JTOCs become information and problem‑solving nodes, not joysticks. Units go weeks or months without visible support. Under those conditions, teams must experiment within the law and the commander’s intent. They deceive, feint, canalise, and out-think at close range. To succeed here, units need rapid learning and adaptation cycles quickly observing what works in contact, orienting to new realities, making decisions at the lowest level, acting on them, and sharing those lessons horizontally with adjacent teams. If we train only to wait for assets, we will die waiting. Train legal, ethical initiative at the lowest level.
10. Drones: Assume You’ve Been Seen
Soldiers on the line can hear when a Mavic spots them. They know the sound of FPVs accelerating. They move in small bursts, break signature, and expect the sky to be hostile. Drone literacy (behaviour, patterns, strengths, and limits) is as basic now as arcs and grenades once were. Drones aren’t a niche. Every soldier needs a working understanding of UAS threats and cues.
RUSI and NATO analyses of the conflict underscore that drone literacy is now an all-arms survivability requirement, with FPV drones accounting for the majority of equipment losses and forcing constant signature discipline across the front.
11. Mines: Everything That Looks Helpful Can Kill You
He described booby‑trapped radios, flashlights and brand new, attractive-looking kit seeded as bait. Drone‑dropped mines at intersections. Magnetic effects that detonate from metal mass with lethal radii. The environment is designed to punish curiosity and routine. Discipline saves lives. Anything found on the battlefield is guilty until proven innocent.
Ukrainian medics and soldiers report that mines and booby traps often seeded on bodies, equipment, or civilian items cause more casualties than artillery in some sectors, with Russian forces routinely employing perfidy violations such as grenade-rigged corpses.
12. Assaulting Fortified Positions: Close, Brutal, Grenade‑Driven
Assaults are small (often 4–6) and relentless: 15+ grenades for a single trench is not unusual. Corners are pre‑fired to maintain pressure. Top‑cover on trench roofs is cleared at the same time. Defenders hold fire until the last moment. It’s intimate and violent; momentum comes from sequencing, communication and discipline, not speed alone. Close combat isn’t dead. It’s faster, nastier, and more technically demanding than many expect.
13. Medical Reality: When Evacuation Takes Weeks
The ‘golden hour’7https://military-medicine.com/the-death-of-the-golden-hour/ is gone. The fastest evacuation he’s seen was three days; the longest, twelve weeks. Infection becomes a second enemy; wounds that would be routine in a Western hospital turn life‑threatening after days on the line. Antibiotics matter. Medics are stretched; drug accountability becomes extremely difficult under sustained pressure and must be protected by leadership. Blood must be given forward; drones can and do deliver blood bags when roads are cut. Tourniquets and conversions require qualified clinical judgement and resuscitation plans, not rules of thumb. Resource, protect, and listen to your medics. Train for prolonged field care expectations at team level. Treat medical reporting and resupply as operational functions, not afterthoughts.
US Army medicine observations from the conflict confirm evacuations routinely stretch from days to weeks, with drones now delivering blood and critical supplies forward while medics must master prolonged field care far beyond traditional golden-hour assumptions.
14. Loss Is the Price – Not the Exception
He lost two of his closest mates in a sudden close‑quarter fight, then fought through with one other survivor to finish six Russians. ‘Get with the terms that you’ll have very little wins at massive cost,’ he said. ‘War’s not fun.’ Western training often scripts victories to build confidence. Reality does not. Prepare mentally and emotionally for shock, grief, and ambiguity and still lead through it.
15. The One Skill He Wishes He’d Trained More
‘Operating with nothing. No water, no food, no Starlink, no ISR, no assets. Just your team.’ Self‑reliance is not aspirational; it’s required. Schedule genuinely asset‑denied training and measure performance, not promises.
Notes
- 1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AKM ↩︎
- 2https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/four-years-ten-lessons-russias-war-ukraine ↩︎
- 3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combat_identification ↩︎
- 4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M4_carbine ↩︎
- 5https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/australian-army-journal-aaj/volume-1-number-2/essential-debate-combined-arms-and-close-battle-complex-terrain ↩︎
- 6https://www.army.mil/article/238732/standard_operating_procedures_this_is_the_way_weve_always_done_it ↩︎
- 7https://military-medicine.com/the-death-of-the-golden-hour/ ↩︎
Ed. Many of the tactical patterns observed in Ukraine are not new. The interaction between terrain, firepower, and decision-making has shaped battlefields for centuries. What is new is the speed at which these lessons are being observed, adapted, and disseminated in real time. The Tactical Innovations Hub will continue to analyse game-changing tactical adaptations across the history of warfare.
If you would like to contribute a guest article on tactical innovations in warfare, I would be very interested to hear from you. Articles should be clear, well-structured, and grounded in evidence or experience. All guest contributions are fully attributed.
📚 Further Reading: Modern Warfare Post-1945
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FAQ – Russo-Ukraine War
The current war began on 24 February 2022, when Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has earlier origins in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and fighting began in eastern Ukraine.
The conflict is primarily between Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine is supported by a range of countries, particularly NATO members, through military aid, intelligence, training, and economic support. Russian forces include regular army units and supporting paramilitary and mercenary formations. North Korean regular forces have also fought on the Russian side, particularly during Russian efforts to reduce a Ukrainian salient in the Kursk region.
The majority of combat has taken place in eastern and southern Ukraine, including the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Fighting has occurred around major cities and along extended fortified lines across these areas.
The war includes a combination of conventional and modern warfare methods, including artillery-heavy combat, armoured operations, drone usage, electronic warfare, and long-range missile strikes. Trench systems and fortified positions have also been widely used along the front lines. The war opened with mechanised armoured thrusts from multiple directions, then shifted to massed infantry assaults supported by artillery, and is now dominated by drone and counter-drone warfare.
The conflict remains ongoing, with front lines barely shifting over time. Both sides continue to conduct offensive and defensive operations, and no political settlement has been reached.
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