❓Military Thinkers, Theorists & Innovators Quiz. Test your knowledge!

Clausewitz argued that war cannot be understood separately from the political purposes that give rise to it. His formulation connecting war and politics remains one of the most frequently discussed propositions in military theory.

Mao conceived protracted war as a changing relationship of strength rather than permanent guerrilla warfare. A weaker revolutionary force could survive and expand, move towards equilibrium, and eventually develop the strength required to take the strategic offensive.

In Battle Studies, du Picq examined how soldiers actually behaved in combat, emphasising morale, cohesion, fear and discipline. He argued that weapons and formations could not be understood without considering the human beings who had to employ them under battlefield stress.

For Mao, guerrilla warfare was part of a broader political-military struggle rather than an end in itself. Revolutionary forces could use it to survive, mobilise support and accumulate strength before progressively adopting more conventional forms of warfare.

Liddell Hart argued that successful strategy should dislocate an opponent psychologically and physically rather than simply attack strength directly. His formulation of the “indirect approach” became one of the best-known concepts in twentieth-century strategic writing.

Schlieffen’s thinking emphasised envelopment and the concentration of overwhelming strength against one opponent to obtain a rapid decision. It reflected Germany’s strategic problem of potentially facing France and Russia simultaneously.

Clausewitz used coup d’œil for the commander’s ability to perceive the important truth of a military situation despite uncertainty and incomplete information. It was closely connected to judgement and resolution rather than simply good eyesight or reconnaissance.

Liddell Hart argued that striking directly against an opponent’s established strength was often wasteful. Manoeuvre and surprise should instead dislocate the enemy physically and psychologically, creating circumstances in which resistance became substantially more difficult.

Auftragstaktik developed around the idea that subordinates needed sufficient freedom to respond to circumstances that higher commanders could not foresee. Understanding the purpose of the mission allowed them to adapt their actions while continuing to serve the higher commander’s intent.

Triandafillov examined the scale, depth and continuity of operations in modern industrial warfare. His work became an important intellectual foundation for the Soviet development of Deep Battle and Deep Operations during the interwar period.

Luttwak argues that strategy often operates according to a paradoxical logic: an obvious and efficient course attracts preparation and opposition, potentially making a less direct course advantageous. Strategy is therefore interactive rather than simply a search for technical efficiency.

Boyd’s idea was more sophisticated than simply “making decisions faster”. Rapid and unexpected changes can disrupt an opponent’s orientation, making their decisions increasingly inappropriate to the situation they are actually confronting.

Lanchester developed mathematical models describing attrition between opposing forces. His famous square-law model suggested that, under particular assumptions for aimed fire, combat power could increase with the square of the number of combatants rather than simply in direct proportion to numbers.

Clausewitz used the physical metaphor of a centre of gravity to describe concentrations of strength and cohesion whose effects extended through the enemy system. Later military doctrine has developed and formalised the concept considerably beyond Clausewitz’s original discussion.

Modern manoeuvre-warfare advocates emphasised tempo, initiative, surprise and attacks against vulnerabilities to create systemic disruption. The objective was not necessarily to destroy every enemy formation but to make the opposing force unable to function coherently.

Callwell attempted to derive principles from nineteenth-century British and other colonial campaigns. Small Wars examined operations against irregular and non-European opponents, although many of its assumptions and language reflect the imperial attitudes of its period.

Schelling examined violence as a form of bargaining as well as destruction. The threatened or limited use of force could be intended to alter an opponent’s behaviour, making coercion and deterrence fundamentally interactive political processes.

Guibert’s Essai général de tactique examined both military organisation and the relationship between armies and society. He anticipated the potential power of a state able to mobilise its population, foreshadowing aspects of the mass warfare that emerged during the French Revolution.

Giáp treated political mobilisation and military action as interconnected elements of a prolonged struggle. Vietnamese forces developed from guerrilla and regional forces towards increasingly capable regular formations able to undertake major conventional operations.

Brodie was among the earliest strategists to recognise the revolutionary implications of nuclear weapons. He argued that the overriding purpose of military power in the nuclear age increasingly became preventing catastrophic war through deterrence.