Sun Tzu

The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides’ monumental account of the Peloponnesian War (432BC – 404BC) remains the earliest rigorous analysis of power politics, strategic motivation, leadership failure, and the psychology of conflict. His narrative combines eyewitness detail with a reflective, almost clinical examination of why states go to war and how fear, honour, and interest shape their choices. The famous speeches — Melian Dialogue, Pericles’ Funeral Oration, the Mytilene Debate — reveal how democracies and autocracies rationalise war and grapple with strategic necessity.

The Art of War by Sun Tzu

Written around 2,500 years ago, The Art of War remains a concise and timeless treatise on deception, intelligence, adaptability, and using an enemy’s weaknesses against them. Sun Tzu focuses on achieving victory with minimal cost, often through indirect approaches, surprise, and careful preparation. Though brief, the work remains widely read across military, political, and business spheres.

De Re Militari by Flavius Vegetius

De Re Militari by Vegetius explains how the Romans organized their armies, battles, sieges, and war strategies. De Re Militari is essential to understand European strategy and war due to the fact that, besides describing the military might of Rome in practical terms, it was also used by generals and rulers in the next centuries and the Middle Ages to organize European armies, conduct sieges, reinforce castles, train soldiers, and conquer enemy nations.

Art of War by Niccolo Machiavelli 

Machiavelli’s lesser-known military treatise complements The Prince with a practical examination of armies, discipline, leadership, logistics, and civic virtue. Drawing heavily on Roman precedent, he argues that the character of an army reflects the character of its state, and that citizen militias — disciplined, patriotic, cohesive — provide the firmest foundation for military strength.

The Art of War by Baron de Antoine Henri Jomini

Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini was the most influential military theorist of the 19th century, shaping the education, operational thinking, and campaign planning of an entire generation of commanders. Drawing on his service under both Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I, Jomini sought to distil the “science” of warfare into clear, prescriptive rules. Summary of the Art of War outlines his central ideas: lines of operation, bases, decisive points, interior lines, the importance of concentration, and the strategic offensive supported by tactical defensive advantage. Jomini wrote with the confidence of someone convinced that warfare followed predictable, almost geometric principles.

Instructions for His Generals by Frederick the Great

“War is not an affair of chance,” Frederick asserted, adding that “a great deal of knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well.” In this book, he presents the fundamentals of warfare, discussing such timeless considerations as leadership qualities, the value of surprise, and ways to conquer an enemy who possesses superior forces.

Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings
by Helmuth von Moltke

Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke is best known for his direction of the German/Prussian campaigns against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71, yet it was during his service as chief of the General Staff that he laid the foundation for the German way of war which would continue through 1945.

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History by Alfred Thayer Mahan

Mahan argued that maritime power — fleets, commerce, naval bases, and sea lines of communication — is the determining factor in national strength. His book reshaped global policy, influencing Britain, Japan, Germany, and the United States.While focused on naval strategy, Mahan’s themes of logistics, projection, and communications have direct application to my battle studies, especially where a sea campaign projects seamlessly into a land campaign as in the D-Day landings in 1944, and other expeditionary and amphibious operations.

The Command of The Air by Giulio Douhet

Douhet was the first major theorist to argue that airpower could win wars independently by striking directly at an enemy’s population, infrastructure, and morale. He viewed the bomber as an unstoppable strategic weapon that would render surface warfare secondary. While many of his predictions proved exaggerated, his book spurred decades of strategic bombing doctrine and continues to influence airpower theory today.

Strategy: by B. H. Liddell Hart

After first-hand experience of the ‘direct approach’ on the western front in WW1, Basil Liddell Hart believed there must be a better strategy than pitting your own strength against an enemy’s strength. He found his answers in history. He argued that the most successful commanders — from Epaminondas to T.E. Lawrence — used an indirect approach that sought to dislocate rather than destroy the enemy. His sweeping historical survey highlights psychological, operational, and logistical dimensions often overlooked by traditional military historians.

Strategy in the Missile Age by Bernard Brodie

Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960’s, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war.

Arms and Influence, by Thomas C. Schelling

Traditionally, Americans have viewed war as an alternative to diplomacy, and military strategy as the science of victory. Today, however, in our world of nuclear weapons, military power is not so much exercised as threatened. It is,Mr. Schelling says, bargaining power, and the exploitation of this power, for good or evil, to preserve peace or to threaten war, is diplomacy—the diplomacy of violence. He sees the steps taken by the U.S. during the Berlin and Cuban crises as not merely preparations for engagement, but as signals to an enemy, with reports from the adversary’s own military intelligence as our most important diplomatic communications.

On Thermonuclear War by Herman Kahn

We studied this at Army War College – and the clinical discussion of global annihiliation is deeply disturbing.

On Thermonuclear War was controversial when originally published and remains so today. It is iconoclastic, crosses disciplinary boundaries, and finally it is calm and compellingly reasonable. The book was widely read on both sides of the Iron Curtain. As a result, both sides were better able to avoid disaster during the Cold War. Kahn’s stated purpose in writing this book was simply: “avoiding disaster and buying time, without specifying the use of this time.” By the late 1950s, with both sides H-bomb-armed, reason and time were in short supply.

Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War

John Boyd served as a fighter pilot and instructor during the Korean War, and it was in the cockpit that he first developed his uncompromising views on what a true air-combat fighter should be – fast, agile, minimalist, and able to seize initiative in a constantly shifting environment. From this experience, he distilled a model of decision-making that became the foundation of his strategic legacy: the OODA Loop (Observe–Orient–Decide–Act).

Primary resource: John Boyd — “A Discourse on Winning and Losing”

COMMAND In WAR by Martin Van Creveld

Van Creveld examines the evolution of command systems from ancient times to the late 20th century, analysing how information, uncertainty, logistics, and organisational culture constrain or empower commanders. A landmark study in command-and-control theory.

Van Creveld’s insights into the ever increasing demand for information and the ever increasing size of teh headquarters needed to process the information, with all the internal friction that creates, is deeply insightful.

Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change by Williamson Murray

Military Adaptation in War addresses one of the most persistent, yet rarely examined, problems that military organizations confront: namely, the problem of how to adapt under the trying, terrifying conditions of war. This work builds on the volume that Professor Williamson Murray edited with Allan Millett on military innovation (a quite different problem, though similar in some respects).

Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle by Ardant di Picq

Universal truths of war endure: the human element shapes victory as powerfully as any instrument of battle. In this classic study, Ardant du Picq argues that timeless courage, endurance, and judgment drive outcomes on every field of battle, from antiquity to modern frontlines. This edition makes his penetrating insights accessible to today’s reader, linking past lessons to the realities of warfare across eras.

Foundations on the Science of War by J F C Fuller

Fuller was one of the earliest proponents of armoured warfare, arguing that mechanisation would reorder the entire battlefield: tempo, shock, mobility, and operational reach. The Foundations on the Science of War articulates his effort to give warfare a systematic, almost scientific framework. His ideas heavily influenced pre-WW2 armoured theorists on both sides of the Atlantic — and were studied closely in Germany.

Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii by Richard Simpkin

After observing the systemic paralysis suffered by the Austro-Hungarian Army during the 1916 Brusilov Offensive, Mikhail Tukhachevskii, along with Triandafillov and Isserson, developed the Soviet doctrine of Deep Battle and Deep Operations, arguing that modern war required simultaneous penetration across the tactical, operational, and strategic depths of an enemy defensive system. His ideas emphasised massive mechanised formations, break-in forces, break-through forces, exploitation forces, air-mechanised forces, tempo, operational shock, and the destruction of an enemy’s system rather than its frontline.

Achtung – Panzer! by Heinz Guderian

Guderian synthesised the ideas of Fuller, Liddell Hart, and early German mechanisation experiments into a clear argument for armoured concentration, radio-enabled command, and combined arms manoeuvre. Achtung Panzer! outlines the conceptual roots of German Blitzkrieg successes and reflects Guderian’s operational experience and doctrinal evangelism.

On Guerilla Warfare: Mao Tse-Tung On Guerilla Warfare – Mao Zedong (Author), Samuel B. Griffith (Translator)

Mao’s military writings codified the principles of protracted revolutionary warfare: the integration of political and military struggle, the use of the population as a strategic base, and the idea that guerrilla forces can evolve into conventional armies once conditions allow. His doctrine shaped insurgencies worldwide and remains influential in both military and political science.

Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Annotated Edition
by Roger Trinquier

Roger Trinquier undertook three tours in Indochina, progressively developing his ideas for defeating a communist inspired insurgency. In his third tour in 1951-53. he led a Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA) , operating behind enemy lines with locally recruited commandos. He later served multiple tours in Algeria and assumed command of the legendary 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment when Marcel Bigeard was recalled to France. After leaving the French Army, Trinquer was hired by Moise Tshombe in 1961 during Katanga’s attempted succession from the Congo.

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula

This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats. Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s for lessons to apply to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Accidental Guerrilla by David Kilcullen

My Staff College colleague David Kilcullen analyses modern insurgencies through the lens of anthropology, terrain, culture, and political dynamics. He argues that insurgencies often emerge not from grand anti-Western ideology but from local grievances and accidental alignments. His work blends field experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, and Africa into a coherent theory of modern irregular warfare.

Men Against Fire: The Problem Of Battle Command In Future War by S.L.A. Marshall

S. L. A. “Slam” Marshall was a veteran of World War I and a combat historian during World War II. He stunned the military and civilian world in 1947 by announcing that, in an average infantry company, no more than one in four soldiers actually fired their weapons while in contact with the enemy. His contention was based on interviews he conducted immediately after combat in both the European and Pacific theatres of World War II. Marshall’s work led to fundamental changes in the way armies trained for war, even down to the type of targetry used for range practices. By the time of the Vietnam War, the new training methods had changed the experience of battle.

The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme

John Keegan’s groundbreaking portrayal of the common soldier in the heat of battle is a masterpiece that explores the physical, psychological and experiential aspects of warfare. The Face of Battle is military history from the battlefield: a look at the direct experience of individuals at the “point of maximum danger.” Without the myth-making elements of rhetoric and xenophobia, and breaking away from the stylised format of battle descriptions, John Keegan has written what is probably the definitive model for military historians.

Acts of War: Behavior of Men in Battle by Richard Holmes

Through interviews, historical accounts, and numerous years of research, Richard Holmes examines the behaviour of men in battle through the course of war. In this compelling attempt to explain the nature of war, the experience of a soldier during the days of battle is revealed. Acts of War takes readers through a soldier’s experience from beginning to end—starting with the tribulations of basic training to the terror and exhaustion of battle.

Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age by Peter Paret (Editor), Gordon A. Craig (Editor), Felix Gilbert (editor)

The essays in this volume analyse war, its strategic characteristics, and its political and social functions over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age takes its title from an earlier collection of essays that became a classic of historical scholarship.

The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective by Hew Strachan

The wars since 9/11, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, have generated frustration and an increasing sense of failure in the West. Much of the blame has been attributed to poor strategy. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, public enquiries and defence think tanks have detected a lack of consistent direction, of effective communication, and of governmental coordination. In this important book, Sir Hew Strachan, one of the world’s leading military historians, reveals how these failures resulted from a fundamental misreading and misapplication of strategy itself.

Strategy: A History by Sir Lawrence Freedman

The range of Freedman’s narrative is extraordinary, moving from the surprisingly advanced strategy practiced in primate groups, to the opposing strategies of Achilles and Odysseus in The Iliad, the strategic advice of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the great military innovations of Baron Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, the grounding of revolutionary strategy in class struggles by Marx, the insights into corporate strategy found in Peter Drucker and Alfred Sloan, and the contributions of the leading social scientists working on strategy today.

Utility of Force: The Art Of War In The Modern World by Rupert Smith

Why do we try to use military force to solve our political problems? And why, when our forces win the military battles, does this still fail to solve those problems? It is because the force lacks utility. From Iraq to the Balkans, and from Afghanistan to Chechnya, over the past fifteen years, there has been a steady stream of military interventions that have not delivered on their promise for peace, or even political resolution. The Utility of Force explains this anomaly at the heart of our current international system.