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⚔️🔒Siege of Tuyên Quang, Tonkin, 24 Nov 1884 – 3 March 1885

The Foreign Legion’s Camerone in Tonkin!

The Siege of Tuyên Quang (Tuyen Quang) is one of the most famous battles in Foreign Legion history. From 24 November 1884 to 3 March 1885, ~630 French and Tonkinese defenders held the citadel of Tuyen Quang against a force of 15,000 Chinese and Black Flag Army troops. Their endurance, and Colonel Giovanninelli’s epic 300km relief march, made the siege one of the Foreign Legion’s most legendary battles.

“Au Tonkin, la Légion immortelle.“
(In Tonkin, the immortal Legion)
“À Tuyên Quang illustra notre drapeau.”
(At Tuyên Quang, it [the Legion] glorified our flag)
— First verse from the Foreign Legion’s marching song, Le Boudin

Siege of Tuyên Quang, from Le Journal Illustre, 22 March 1885
Siege of Tuyên Quang, from Le Journal Illustre, 22 March 1885

Key facts

🗺️ Siege of Tuyên Quang, Tonkin, November 1884 – March 1885
⚔️ Tonkin Campaign, 1883-86
🪖 ~630 soldiers of the French Foreign Legion and Tonkinese troops vs ~15,000 Chinese Regulars and Black Flag troops
🎯 Chinese Yunnan regulars and the Black Flag Army besiege an isolated French outpost. A relief force makes an epic 300km forced march to relieve the garrison and fight the bloodiest battle of the war at Hoa Moc.
Visit the virtual museum of weapons, uniforms and equipment of the French Colonial Wars

You may also be interested in these firsthand battlefield studies covering the Tonkin Campaign and Sino-French War: Tonkin Campaign / Sino-French War (1883-86) ♦ Sơn Tây Campaign (1883) ♦ Bắc Lệ Ambush (1884) ♦ Siege of Tuyên Quang (1884-85) ♦ Battle of Hòa Mộc (1885)


Google Earth map – location of Tuyên Quang


🧭🥾 Walking the Battlefield of Tuyên Quang

I visited the Tuyên Quang battlefield in April 2025. I was equipped with unit histories, copies of original orders, maps and sketches, firsthand and secondary accounts of the battle, and my own digital GIS overlays to pull it all together. Tuyên Quang has undergone significant changes since 1885, but the footprint of the old 300-metre-by-300-metre citadel is unmistakable in the modern road system. The steep-sided hill, ‘Le Grand Mamelon‘, that housed the old citadel pagoda remains. Portions of the wall on all sides are still visible and have been incorporated into modern structures. The roads that bisected the citadel are now the city’s main thoroughfares. The old western gate of the citadel is now in the middle of a roundabout (traffic circle). The southern gate is also partially intact and forms another quasi-roundabout that traffic must pass. The dominating terrain along the Clear (Lo) River is unmistakable, as evident in my ‘Then and Now’ image.

It was a great privilege to visit this remote battlefield, part of French Foreign Legion folklore!

Then and now comparison. The outline of the old citadel is clearly evident in modern Tuyen Quang, including sections of the wall and the west and south gates

For those who prefer to listen, this article is also available as a 78-minute podcast

Tip: If Podbean overlay appears after pausing, click the × in the top-right corner to return to the player controls.



Origins of the conflict

By the mid-19th century, France had entered the wider imperial contest for influence in Asia. French missionaries had been active in Cochinchina (southern Vietnam) since the 18th century, and their presence provided both a pretext and a foothold for later intervention. Following a brief campaign in 1862, France annexed several southern provinces to form the colony of Cochinchina. Further north, Annam and Tonkin remained nominally under the Nguyễn dynasty but were subject to Chinese suzerainty — a political arrangement that France increasingly sought to overturn.

Garnier’s 1873 expedition to Tonkin

In 1873, Lieutenant Francis Garnier led a small, unauthorised expedition up the Red River and briefly seized Hanoi. His success alarmed both the Vietnamese court and the Chinese authorities, who regarded Tonkin as part of their sphere of influence. Garnier was killed on 21 December 1873 in action against the Chinese-supported Black Flag Army near Thủ Lệ. The French withdrew under diplomatic pressure, and a temporary settlement restored the pre-existing order.

Lieutenant Francis Garnier is killed in battle with Chinese ‘Black Flag’ troops near Thủ Lệ on 21 December 1873
Lieutenant Francis Garnier is killed in battle with Chinese ‘Black Flag’ troops near Thủ Lệ on 21 December 1873

Riviere’s 1881-1883 campaigns

A decade later, Captain Henri Rivière arrived in Hanoi with instructions to protect French interests but soon exceeded them. Acting on his own initiative, he bombarded and captured the Imperial Citadel on 25 April 1882, forcing local officials to submit. The Vietnamese emperor appealed once more to Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag Army, while the Chinese government covertly reinforced Tonkin with regular troops from Yunnan and Guangxi.

Rivière pressed on regardless, capturing Nam Định and Gia Cúc in March 1883. On 19 May, his column was ambushed and destroyed by the Black Flags at Cầu Giấy (Paper Bridge). Rivière’s death turned local tensions into open war.

Captain Henri Rivière is isolated and cut down by Black Flag troops during the Battle of Cầu Giấy (the “Paper Bridge”), 19 May 1883.
Captain Henri Rivière is isolated and cut down by Black Flag troops during the Battle of Cầu Giấy (the “Paper Bridge”), 19 May 1883.

The Sơn Tây Campaign, December 1883

Rivière’s loss provoked a decisive response from Paris. Admiral Amédée Courbet took command of the reinforced Tonkin Expeditionary Corps and attacked the heavily fortified town of Sơn Tây, defended by a combined force of Chinese, Black Flag, and Annamite troops. After fierce fighting in December 1883, Courbet captured the citadel, dealing a severe blow to both Chinese prestige and the Black Flags’ combat power.

With operations shifting from the coast to the interior, command passed from Courbet to General Charles-Théodore Millot. French victories at Bắc Ninh, Hưng Hóa, and Thái Nguyên secured control of the Red River Delta and pushed Chinese forces north toward the frontier. On 1 June 1884, a composite column — including a battalion of the Foreign Legion — occupied Tuyên Quang, a small post on the Clear River about 140 km northwest of Hanoi.

The Tientsin Accord and the Bắc Lệ Ambush

China’s field armies had been defeated in Tonkin, and the Black Flag Army was in retreat. Seeking to avoid a wider war, both sides concluded the Tientsin Accord on 11 May 1884, under which China recognised the French protectorate over Annam and Tonkin in exchange for the withdrawal of all Chinese forces, and a new commercial treaty.

In June, a French column under Lieutenant-Colonel Alphonse Dugenne advanced north from Hanoi toward Lạng Sơn to occupy the frontier posts as agreed. Near Bắc Lệ, Dugenne’s force was ambushed by Chinese regulars who had not yet withdrawn. The French executed an orderly fighting retreat, but the Bắc Lệ Ambush shattered the diplomatic accord and triggered the Sino-French War.

The French defensive square at Bắc Lệ, about 150 metres long on each side. The Nuï-Dong-Naï cliffs are in the background. The mules and baggage can be seen in the centre of the square.
The French defensive square at Bắc Lệ, about 150 metres long on each side. The Nuï-Dong-Naï cliffs are in the background. The mules and baggage can be seen in the centre of the square.

Towards the Siege of Tuyên Quang

As hostilities spread across Tonkin, the Chinese provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, and the island of Formosa (Taiwan), the French sought to hold their remote forward posts along the Clear River (Sông Lô). These garrisons formed a thin shield protecting the Red River Delta from incursions by Yunnanese regulars and remnants of Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag forces.

Among them, Tuyên Quang was the most exposed — an isolated citadel defended by a few hundred Legionnaires, Tonkinese Tirailleurs, and artillerymen. Its commander, Chef de Bataillon Marc-Edmond Dominé, resolved to hold the post whatever the cost.1Dick de Lonlay (Émile Bayard), La Légion au Tonkin: Siège de Tuyên Quang, (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1886), pp. 9–12

A graduate of Saint-Cyr (1868), Dominé had served with distinction in Algeria and the Franco-Prussian War. He was twice wounded — at Aïn-Chaïr in April 1870 and again at Orléans later that year. In late 1883, he deployed to Tonkin with the 2nd Battalion d’Afrique, bringing with him the professionalism and resolve that would soon define the defence of Tuyên Quang.

Chef de Bataillon (Major) Marc-Edmond Dominé. He was badly wounded in the right arm at the Battle Orleans during the Franco-Prussian War. This is a later photo and he wears the rank of Colonel.
Chef de Bataillon (Major) Marc-Edmond Dominé. He was badly wounded in the right arm at the Battle Orleans during the Franco-Prussian War. This is a later photo and he wears the rank of Colonel.

The French Garrison

When the siege began in late 1884, the citadel of Tuyên Quang was held by a garrison of approximately 630 men:

  • Two companies (Captains Cattelin and Moulinay) of the 1st Foreign Legion Battalion — about 390 Legionnaires
  • 162 Tonkinese riflemen (Captain Dia), local troops raised and trained under French officers,
  • a detachment of marine artillery with two 4-pounder mountain guns, two 50mm guns and two Hotchkiss 37mm revolving cannons.
  • A small number of engineers (SGT Bobillot) and support personnel completed the complement.2de Lonlay, Siège de Tuyên Quang, pp. 10–12.
  • The Farcy-type gunboats Revolver and the Mitrailleuse, armed with a heavy 14-pounder cannon in the bow, and a Hotchkiss 37mm revolving cannon on the upper deck. These powerful gunboats played a critical role in protecting the Clear River flank of Tuyen Quang citadel.
  • The commandant was Marc-Edmond Dominé, an officer of the marine infantry who had seen extensive service in North Africa, the Franco-Prussian War and Indochina. Calm, methodical, and respected for his composure under pressure, Dominé embodied the professional ethos of France’s colonial corps. His challenge was formidable: to defend a dilapidated Annamite citadel against overwhelming numbers, with supplies limited to what convoys and gunboats could bring through.3Douglas Porch, The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force (New York: Harper & Row, 1991), p. 213.
Legionnaire in the Tonkin Campaign
Legionnaire in the Tonkin Campaign

The garrison’s strength lay not in its walls but in its discipline. The Legionnaires were veteran campaigners, accustomed to hardship, well-drilled in fire discipline, and renowned for steadiness under pressure.

The Tonkinese riflemen, though sometimes disparaged by French officers, would prove equally tenacious in the coming siege, standing their ground in trenches and blockhouses despite privation. The artillery detachment had only light pieces, sufficient to sweep the approaches but not to silence enemy batteries; their ammunition had to be conserved with the utmost care.4de Lonlay, Siège de Tuyên Quang. pp. 30–33.

Morale was sustained by routine and by the presence of Chaplain Father Boisset, whose tireless pastoral work became legendary. Supplies were always short, and disease a constant threat, but the garrison carried itself with a quiet determination. Their greatest weakness was isolation: once the besiegers closed in, Tuyên Quang could only survive if relieved in time.


The Besiegers – Black Flag Army and Chinese Yunnan Army

Opposing the French defenders was a 10-15,000 man combined force of Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag Army and regular Chinese troops from Yunnan. The Black Flags were experienced irregulars, seasoned in the hills of Tonkin, armed with a mixture of rifles, muskets, and jingals (heavy wall-guns). They excelled at ambush, trench warfare, and siege tactics. The Yunnan regulars, drawn from the provincial army, provided artillery and engineering capabilities. Together, they constituted the largest enemy concentration yet assembled against an isolated French post.

Liu Yongfu himself was a figure of notoriety, a former Taiping rebel turned mercenary warlord. Under his leadership, the Black Flags had long resisted foreign encroachment in Tonkin, sometimes cooperating with Vietnamese mandarins, sometimes with the Qing authorities. The Yunnanese, by contrast, brought structure and discipline: their officers directed the construction of parallels, batteries, and mining operations in the style of formal siegecraft.5Stephen R. Platt, Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China’s Last Golden Age (London: Atlantic Books, 2018), p. 430.

The besiegers’ artillery included heavy guns dragged laboriously from the frontier. They established a network of trenches and stockades around the post, gradually tightening the noose. Their numbers allowed them to rotate troops, maintain constant bombardment, and launch repeated assaults.

A soldier of Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag Army
A soldier of Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag Army

Yet weaknesses were evident. Coordination between Black Flag irregulars and Yunnan regulars was imperfect, with rivalries and suspicion limiting efficiency. Their tactical doctrine, honed in the Taiping War, relied on massed assault, often against well-prepared defences where French fire discipline inflicted disproportionate casualties. Siege logistics were also complex: the besiegers had to sustain thousands of men in rugged country with limited local resources, straining their ability to maintain the siege.6Porch, The French Foreign Legion, p. 217.

Balance of Forces

On the eve of the siege, the imbalance seemed stark: ~630 French troops in a dilapidated fort against a host twenty times their number. But the disparity was not as absolute as the figures suggest. The defenders had cohesion, professional leadership, and the advantage of fortifications, however modest. The besiegers had the weight of numbers and artillery, but lacked the training to decisively exploit their superiority.


The Citadel of Tuyên Quang

The citadel of Tuyên Quang, into which the French settled during mid-1884, was no fortress in the European sense. It was an old Annamite enclosure of earth and decayed brick, an irregular square measuring some three hundred metres on each side. Its ramparts were low, the parapets crumbling, and its corner towers more ruin than bastion. Around it stretched a shallow ditch, half-filled with silt, crossed in places by bamboo bridges. In the centre of each of the four walls, a fortified gatehouse projected outwards to control access to the citadel.

Beyond the walls lay an Annamite village, a cluster of huts, and the local pagoda, which dominated the site.7de Lonlay, Siège de Tuyên Quang, p. 17. Inside the northern sector of the enclosure was a steep-sided hill, Le Grand Mamelon, about 40 metres high with a fortified keep on the crest. Most of the land around was flat, so this hill dominated the area with observation out to five kilometres. Commandant Dominé based his headquarters on this peak, plus some artillery pieces and artillery observers.

View of the Tuyen Quang citadel from the Clear River (eastern) side. In the foreground is the Farcy-Class gunboat Mitrailleuse, with its bow-mounted heavy 14-pounder breech-loader. The low brick walls of the citadel and the eastern fortified gate are clearly depicted. Dominating the northern end of the citadel enclosure is the 40-metre-high Le Grand Mamelon, with the pagoda on top. Painting by Luis Janzin, late 19th century.
View of the Tuyen Quang citadel from the Clear River (eastern) side. In the foreground is the Farcy-Class gunboat Mitrailleuse, with its bow-mounted heavy 14-pounder breech-loader. The low brick walls of the citadel and the eastern fortified gate are clearly depicted. Dominating the northern end of the citadel enclosure is the 40-metre-high Le Grand Mamelon, with the pagoda on top. Painting by Luis Janzin, late 19th century.

Hardening the defences

When Chef de Bataillon Marc-Edmond Dominé took command, his first concern was to adapt these archaic works to modern defence. Legionnaires and Tonkinese riflemen were set to labour, strengthening parapets with fascines and sandbags, raising blockhouses to sweep the walls, and mounting the artillery to cover the approaches. Within weeks, the place, though still humble, had the order of a French post on campaign. Supplies were organised, sectors of the wall assigned, wells dug, and the pagoda converted to an infirmary and storehouse.8Ibid., p. 27.

Tuyen Quang. Southeast side of Le Grand Mamelon. Some of the 199 steps have survived.
Tuyen Quang. Southeast side of Le Grand Mamelon. Some of the 199 steps have survived.

Enemy concentration and first contacts (early–mid Oct 1884)

From early October 1884, Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag Army re-appeared before Tuyên Quang, reinforced by regulars of the Chinese Yunnan Army. By the first week, an estimated ~4,000 Chinese had surrounded the post, establishing camps on the surrounding heights and the right bank of the Clear River. Between 13 Oct – 16 Nov 1884, the besiegers executed twenty-four attacks and forceful probes, all repulsed by controlled fire from the citadel and outworks. The Chinese were probing the defences and testing French firepower. These actions marked the transition from harassment to an organised investment directed by Chinese regulars.

General Tang Jingsong, commander of the Yunnan Army during the Siege of Tuyen Quang. General Tang was an expert in siege warfare.
General Tang Jingsong, commander of the Yunnan Army during the Siege of Tuyen Quang. General Tang was an expert in siege warfare.
Liu Yongfu, adventurer and commander of the private Black Flag Army. The Black Flags cooperated with the regular Yunnan Army forces during the siege.
Liu Yongfu, adventurer and commander of the private Black Flag Army. The Black Flags cooperated with the regular Yunnan Army forces during the siege.

Gunboat action at Yuoc Pass (~15 November 1884)

To secure the river line of communication, gunboat Revolver attempted to force the Yuoc Pass, a narrow, steep-sided defile ~10 km south of the post. The Chinese had sunk junks to create a dam, emplaced a four-gun battery on the left bank, and covered the right bank with multiple trench lines and hidden forts. As Revolver rammed the junk barrier to break the dam, the Chinese opened fire at point- blank range. 13 out of the 15 crew members were killed or wounded. Ensign Testu de Balaincourt, grievously wounded, remained at the helm for more than five hours to guide the boat to safety. Delonlay notes this as the first serious engagement on the Clear River, so vital to keeping the post supplied.9Ibid., pp. 6–7.

Gunboat Revolver running the Chinese barrier at Yuoc Pass. The armoured gunboat was able to break through the Chinese barrier constructed of junks tied together across the Clear River
Gunboat Revolver running the Chinese barrier at Yuoc Pass. The armoured gunboat was able to break through the Chinese barrier constructed of junks tied together across the Clear River

Temporary relief by Duchesne’s column (16–19 Nov 1884)

With pressure mounting, Lt-Col Duchesne embarked a relief detachment (Foreign Legion and Marine Infantry) from Hồng Hóa on 16 November 1884 and advanced by junks up the Clear River. The troops landed at Hòa Mộc, about eight kilometres south of Tuyen Quang, on 18 November, bivouacking close to Chinese defensive positions. On 19 November, Duchesne struck first, defeating Black Flag and Imperial detachments and pursuing them into the forested hills. That night, around 22:00, Duchesne‘s column entered the citadel and resupplied the garrison. This sharp offensive momentarily dispersed the nearest enemy groupings and restored supplies before the relief force withdrew.

Return of the besiegers and formal investment (23–26 Nov 1884)

Duchesne’s column departed Tuyên Quang on 23 November 1884. The besiegers immediately reoccupied their former positions and resumed the approach works. On 24 November 1884, the post was formally declared in a state of siege. Delonlay’s chapter break at this point (“The Investment”) confirms the transition to a systematic siege: trench parallels, covered ways, and batteries began to creep toward the enceinte.10de Lonlay, p. 20.

Dominé refused to remain passive. He ordered sorties to disrupt enemy preparations. A patrol was sent on 24 November to break up the Chinese junk barrier at Yuoc Pass, but was only partially successful. Another patrol on 26 November was sent to the villages of Yla and Tuong-Mou to ensure the rice harvest made it to the citadel, and was not left to the Black Flags.11Ibid., p. 20.

Tuyen Quang Citadel and the Chinese 1st Parallel trenches, around late November 1884
Tuyen Quang Citadel and the Chinese 1st Parallel trenches, around late November 1884

Garrison posture and supply baseline (late Nov 1884)

Delonlay lists the garrison, ammunition scales, and stores immediately after the declaration, fixing the logistical baseline as the enemy closed. The two Legion companies (eight officers, 390 men), Tonkinese Tirailleurs (two officers, 162 men), marine artillery (one officer, 31 men), and small engineer/medical/admin detachments formed the fighting strength within the enclosure; Revolver and Mitrailleuse on the river flank remained crucial for sustainment when water levels and enemy obstacles permitted. These figures and scales anchor subsequent December–January actions (convoys, sorties, rationing) against a documented starting point.

On 27 November, Commander Dominé received notice from the downstream French outpost at Phu-Doan that 10,000 Black Flags were at Thuan-Quan, 2,000 Black Flags were in Phu-an-Binh, and 1,000 were in the vicinity of Phu-Doan.12Ibid., p. 21.

Model 1874 Fusil Gras, Calibre 11×59mmR Gras

Model 1874 Fusil Gras, Calibre 11×59mmR Gras. Single-shot black powder bolt-action breech-loader. Standard infantry weapon of the French forces at the time of the Siege of Tuyen Quang. From my collection.


👉 Continue reading — this article is part of the BattlefieldTravels Deep Research Collection. The full 13,750 word analysis draws on eyewitness accounts of the 1885 Siege of Tuyên Quang and the Battle of Hoa Moc, GIS terrain analysis, and firsthand fieldwork on the battlefields of Tuyên Quang. Primary source examination, tactical conclusions, and notes & references that exist nowhere else in English. Try membership free for 7 days.


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📚 Further Reading

This battle study nests within the broader analytical framework explored in the Research Hub, where operational methods, operating environments, armies, commanders, and weapons are examined across conflicts and eras. The links below connect related studies across the wider body of battlefield analysis on the BattlefieldTravels site.

⚔️ Explore all battle studies from the Tonkin Campaign 1883-1886
⚔️ Explore all battle studies involving the French Foreign Legion

🏛️Explore the museum of French colonial war historic artefacts

The book list for this conflict includes the finest campaign studies, memoirs, and operational analyses available on the Tonkin Campaign, in both French and English, selected specifically to complement this battlefield study.📚Tonkin Campaign 1883-1886 – Recommended Reading

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FAQ: Siege of Tuyen Quang (Nov 1884-Mar 1885)

What was the Siege of Tuyên Quang?

The siege took place from November 1884 to March 1885 during the Sino-French War, when a French and Tonkinese garrison of about 630 men held the citadel of Tuyên Quang against 15,000 Chinese and Black Flag troops.

Who commanded the French garrison?

Chef de Bataillon Marc-Edmond Dominé commanded the post, leading two companies of the 1st Foreign Legion Battalion, Tonkinese riflemen, and a detachment of marine artillery.

How was the citadel defended?

The old Annamite fort was strengthened with sandbagged parapets, blockhouses, and light guns covering the approaches. Defence relied on discipline and steady rifle fire rather than heavy fortifications.

Who led the besieging forces?

The attackers were a combined force of Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag Army and Yunnan regulars of the Qing Army, using siege trenches, bamboo abatis, and heavy artillery brought from the frontier.

How did the siege end?

After three months of bombardment and repeated assaults, Colonel Giovanninelli’s relief column fought its way through at Hòa Mộc on 2 March 1885 and reached the citadel two days later, forcing the enemy to withdraw.

What were the casualties on each side?

The defenders lost about 33 killed and 76 wounded. The French relief force lost another 76 killed and 408 wounded at the Battle of Hoa Moc. Chinese and Black Flag losses numbered several thousand during the siege and at Hòa Mộc.

Why is Tuyên Quang important in Foreign Legion history?

The siege became a symbol of Legion endurance, celebrated in Le Boudin and compared to Camerone for its demonstration of discipline and honour under siege.

Can visitors see the battlefield today?

Modern Tuyên Quang City has overgrown the original site, but the line of the Clear (Lo) River and local topography still mark the ground once defended. Remnants of the old citadel remain. The provincial museum and river embankment provide orientation for visitors.


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8 thoughts on “⚔️🔒Siege of Tuyên Quang, Tonkin, 24 Nov 1884 – 3 March 1885”

  1. Bravo, Mick! A real tour de force. Tuyên Quang only merits a few pages in Erwan Bergot’s (admittedly short) book of the FFL, and even then only in the context of it being the destination for some French POWs after the fall of Điện Biên Phủ. The chapter titled Tuyên Quang begins with the story of Cao Bằng, slides into the events of 1953-54, and the siege of Tuyên Quang is then retold by one of the POWs to his fellow prisoners. You’ve really filled the gaps and so much more here. Bergot mentions a French memorial (a pillar) that had been erected in 1927 by Major Maire in honour of the garrison and Sergeant Bobillot, which the POWs vow to protect, despite it being the site where their captors established the latrines. I guess it’s gone the way of so many others.

    1. Thanks Tony, took a while to pull that together, but it is now officially the longest battlefield study on the website at 15,000 words. Not covered at all in English, but the French were great observers and great recorders of what they saw, so I was able to pull together several first hand French accounts of the siege, Giovanninelli’s relief march, and the Battle of Hoa Moc.

      I built the battle graphics using original period diagrams and using photoshop to remove all the white background, leaving only the black sketch lines. Then I was able to shade the layers underneath to build coloured graphics.

      Mick

  2. I just realized that I photographed the display cabinet containing the Tuyên Quang pagoda bell (labelled Madagascar and Indochina) when I was at Les Invalides a couple of weeks ago, and didn’t know its significance.

  3. Apropos of the Hotchkiss gun, it was always a source of amusement for me and my fellow (western) Japanese speakers that the Japanese word for a stapler was hochikisu (the phonetic rendering of Hotchkiss), and I occasionally idly wondered whether they were related. Jim Breen, the Australian eminence grise of lexicography and Japanese studies did go down that rabbit hole. https://www.edrdg.org/~jwb/mondir/hotchkiss.html

    1. Store that one away for the next trivia competition! I do find the Hotchkiss gun fascinating. Looks like a Gatling, but completely different functioning. The garrison had two of them at Tuyen Quang, and the Farcy boats had one on the upper deck. They would have wreaked havoc on troops in the open!

  4. Douglas Boyd prefaced his book on the Foreign Legion with a wonderful quote by Captain Borelli referring to his legionnaires who died at Tuyên Quang.

    Sans honneur? Ah, passons. Et sans foi? Qu’est-ce à dire ?
    Que fallait-il de plus et qu’aurait-on voulu ?
    N’avez-vous pas tenu, tenu jusqu’au martyre,
    la parole donnée et le marché conclu ?

    They say that you’re without honour or faith,
    But what more could they have asked?
    Did you not fulfil unto death
    the sworn duty with which you were tasked?

Comments — I welcome your feedback and contributions